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SECTION 6332(b) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
SUMMARY LEVY PROCEDURE ON LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES
United States v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America'
For several decades the insurance industry and the Internal
Revenue Service have struggled over their respective rights in
insurance policies owned by delinquent taxpayers. The insurance
companies desire to retain use of the assets for as long as possible,
while the Internal Revenue Service prefers to satisfy tax claims
against delinquent taxpayers by attaching the policies. In an
effort to alleviate this and other conflicts between the Internal
Revenue Service and private creditors, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Tax Lien Act of 1966.2
United States v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America3 illus-
trates the difficulty encountered in creating a totally workable
compromise between the Internal Revenue Service and the insur-
ance industry, and it reveals the reluctance of one judge and the
Treasury Department to abide by the scheme designed.
Prudential, more specifically, demonstrates the use and construc-
tion of section 6332(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This
section, one of the many revisions of the Code occasioned by the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, provides for a summary levy proce-
dure enabling the Secretary of the Treasury to obtain the cash
loan value of unmatured life insurance policies owned by delin-
quent taxpayers.4
1. 461 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972).
2. Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, P.L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered
sections of 26, 28, 40 U.S.C.). For a summary discussion of all of the sections of the Federal
Tax Lien Act, see note 57 infra.
3. 461 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b). Section 6332(b), a rather small part of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, provides:
§ 6332 SURRENDER OF PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LEVY-
(b) Special Rule for life insurance and endowment contracts.
(1) In general.-A levy on an organization with respect to a life insurance or
endowment contract issued by such organization shall, without necessity for the
surrender of the contract document, constitute a demand by the Secretary or his
delegate for payment of the amount described in paragraph (2) and the exercise of
the right of the person against whom the tax is assessed to the advance of such
amount. Such organization shall pay over such amount 90 days after service of
notice of levy. Such notice shall include a certification by the Secretary or his
delegate that a copy of such notice has been mailed to the person against whom
the tax is assessed at his last known address.
(2) Satisfaction of levy.-Such levy shall be deemed to be satisfied if such organi-
zation pays over to the Secretary or his delegate the amount which the person
against whom the tax is assessed could have had advanced to him by such organiza-
tion on the date prescribed in paragraph (1) for the satisfaction of such levy, in-
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Because the contentions of the majority and minority in
Prudential differ regarding the date on which the cash loan value
is to be determined, it is necessary to examine closely these two
opinions, the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, prior case law, and
legislative history. With the insight afforded by this review, the
validity of the majority's holding and an understanding of the
minority's difficulty will become apparent. Finally, an examina-
creased by the amount of any advance (including contractual interest thereon)
made to such person on or after the date such organization had actual notice or
knowledge (within the meaning of section 6323(i)(1)) of the existence of the lien
with respect to which such levy is made, other than an advance (including contrac-
tual interest thereon) made automatically to maintain such contract in force under
an agreement entered into before such organization had such notice or knowledge.
The Internal Revenue Service has agreed that notice of the tax lien will be served on
the insurance company first by mail. In a few days, service of levy, accompanied by a
certification that a copy of the levy has been mailed to the last known address of the policy
owner, will be made in person upon the company by the Government. This time lapse will
enable the insurance company to place restraints on its records before the policyholder
receives a copy of the notice of levy and attempts to reduce the cash loan value. T.I.R.-
903 (May 29, 1967) (Technical Information Release, IRS Public Information Division). See
Talbot, Tax Liens and Levies on Life Insurance-Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 21 CLU
J., July, 1967, 42, at 45 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Talbot]. The restraints are important
because section 6332(b)(2) does not protect the insurance company from advances it
makes to the insured after notice of levy. Section 6332(b)(2) only protects the insurance
company from advances made automatically to maintain the contract in force, pursuant
to an "agreement entered into before such organization had such notice or knowledge."
United States v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 461 F.2d 208, 213 (5th Cir. 1972). An
example of such an automatic agreement is a contract provision whereby the premiums
are paid automatically from the cash loan value if the premiums are not forwarded by
the insured on time. See note 17 infra. The ninety days is measured from the date of actual
service of levy accompanied by the certification rather than the date of the mailed notice.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.632-2(b)(1)(ii) (1972);
United States v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 461 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1972).
The Internal Revenue Service further agreed to serve liens and levies on persons
designated to be served by the insurance company prior to the levy. These persons could
be, for example, officers or other agents of the company. For the convenience of the
insurance industry, it was agreed that the companies may specify that service is to be
made at a centralized place or at locations covering certain geographical areas. Talbot,
supra at 45. In addition, the Service assented to file notice with the insurer at the end of
the ninety day period to indicate whether payments have been made against the tax
indebtedness. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(b)(2)(i) and (iv) (1972). Talbot, supra at
45.
The Talbot article appearing in the Chartered Life Underwriters Journal is cited
frequently in this paper. At the date of the publication of his article in 1967, Gerald J.
Talbot was Assistant Tax Counsel of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. While
earning his L.L.B. degree from Fordham Law School, Mr. Talbot served on the Law
Review Editorial Board and authored a comment and several case notes. He later received
a L.L.M. in Taxation from the New York University School of Law. Mr. Talbot, a member
of the New York Bar, served on the Committee on Insurance Companies of the Section of
Taxation of the American Bar Association. While Mr. Talbot's article may be available
to the insurance industry, it is not easily accessible to practicing attorneys. The Library
of Congress apparently is the only public subscriber to the Chartered Life Underwriters
Journal in the Washington, D.C. area.
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tion of the "implementation" of section 6332(b) by the Internal
Revenue Service will reveal the Treasury Department's overzeal-
ous attempt to legislate.
THE OPINION
On November 27, 1968, the Government, pursuant to section
6332(b), personally served the defendant, Prudential Insurance
Company of America, with notice of levy on the cash loan value5
of the delinquent taxpayer's modified whole life insurance policy.'
Because of an automatic non-forfeiture clause7 in the insurance
contract, Prudential claimed that default of premium payments
5. A cash loan is often made available in the life insurance contract. The policy
owner has the right to borrow from the company on the sole security of the policy, i.e.,
the right to borrow against the cash surrender value. United States v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d
94 (5th Cir. 1965). Technically, the policy loan is not really a "loan," because the insured
is under no obligation to repay the amount "borrowed." It is more accurately described
as an "advancement or payment of a sum which would otherwise become due in the future
under the policy." W. VANCE, VANCE ON INSURANCE 645 (3d ed. B. Anderson 1951).
The maximum loan available is generally the same as the cash surrender value, which
is usually less than the policy reserve. The cash surrender value is the amount of cash
value available to the insured upon termination of the insurance policy. Id. It is the reserve
less a surrender charge. The policy reserve is the minimum amount required by law that
the company must maintain in order to guarantee future obligations. Accrued out of
premium payments and interest, the policy reserve is the difference between the "present
value of the sum insured and the present value of the future premiums." D. BICKELHAUPT
& J. MAGEE, GENERAL INSURANCE 634 (8th ed. Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1970). The reserve
increases in value as the insured grows older. This accretion offsets the increased risk
resulting from a higher mortality rate. Id. The cash loan value also expands as the policy
reserve grows. W. VANCE, supra at 645. In Prudential, the cash loan value on November
27, 1966, was $1,827.88.
6. Whole life insurance provides coverage for an entire lifetime and matures for
payment only upon the death of the insured. Term life insurance provides for payment of
a specified amount only if death occurs within a specified limited period. Modified insur-
ance may be a combination of whole life and term life insurance. R. KEETON, INSURANCE
LAW BASIC TEXT § 1.3(e), at 13A (1971).
7. An automatic non-forfeiture clause is a contractual provision entitling the policy-
holder to the benefit of the equity built up in the policy after default in premium pay-
ments. After the default and a specified grace period, the policy is automatically converted
into paid-up insurance for a reduced amount or term insurance for the full amount but
for a limited term. W. VANCE, supra note 5, at 610.
For example, the non-forfeiture provision in Prudential provided:
Extended Insurance. In event of default in payment of premium for more than
thirty-one days, the face amount of insurance, reduced by an amount equal to any
existing indebtedness on this Policy and increased by the amount of any existing
paid-up dividend additions on this Policy, will be automatically continued from the
due date of the premium in default as paid-up term insurance for such term as the
present value, as of the due date of the premium in default, of the extended insur-
ance in accordance with the Table of Loan and Non-forfeiture Values, less any
existing indebtedness on this Policy, plus the then present value of any existing
paid-up dividend credits existing on this Policy, will provide at net single premium
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by the insured for thirty-one days, beginning December 20, 1968,
automatically converted the policy into paid-up term insurance'
on January 20, 1969. In the event of automatic conversion into
paid-up term insurance, the insurance contract specifically pro-
vided that the policy was to have no cash loan value. Therefore,
the insurance company contended, on the ninetieth day after
service of notice of levy, February 24, 1969, there was no cash loan
available either to the insured or to the Government. Upon Pru-
dential's refusal to pay on the ninetieth day after service, the
Government, filing suit in the District Court of Florida, urged
that it was entitled under section 6332(b) to the cash loan value
as determined on the date of service. Both parties sought sum-
mary judgment.
The issue presented in Prudential was, therefore, "whether
the Government was entitled under the law to the cash loan value
of the policy on the date of the service of notice of levy, or the
value the policy had 90 days thereafter, when payment was re-
quired." 9 Agreeing with Prudential's assertions, the district court
granted the insurance company's motion for summary judg-
ment. '" The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the Government was entitled to the
amount that the taxpayer could have had advanced to him from
the insurance company, as a cash loan, on the ninetieth day after
service of notice of levy. Because there was no cash loan value on
the ninetieth day after service, Prudential's refusal to pay was
justified."
term insurance rates at the attained age of the Insured. The extended insurance
shall not include any additional benefit in event of death by accidental means.
461 F.2d at 212 n.4.
8. Paid-up insurance is an unilateral contract, executory as to the insurer and com-
pletely executed as to the insured. The insurer promises to pay in accordance with the
agreement without further premium payments by the insured. "Technically the term
'paid-up insurance' is limited to insurance granted as a nonforfeiture benefit after default
in payment of premium .... " W. VANCE, supra note 5, at 610. It is payable in the same
manner and at the same time as the original insurance. Id. at 611. Paid-up term insurance
is the extension of a policy, usually in its original amount reduced by any indebted-
ness, and for so long a period from the due date of the premium in default as the
net value of the policy applied as a single premium as of the date of default will
suffice to continue the coverage on the basis of insured's age at that time and the
mortality table specified in the policy. While the extended insurance is also 'paid-
up,' yet unless the insured dies within the extended term the extended insurance
terminates without value.
Id.
9. 461 F.2d at 210.
10. United States v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 323 F. Supp. 201 (D. Fla. 1971).
11. 461 F.2d at 208. Prudential is the only case interpreting section 6332(b)(2) since
the section's promulgation in 1966. However, other parts of section 6332 have been subject
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The majority, through Judge Roney, emphasized that its
holding was essentially based on the clear wording of the statute.
The court explained:
The levy under paragraph (1) constitutes a demand for pay-
ment of the amount described in paragraph (2). The amount
is there described as the "amount which the [taxpayer]
. . .could have had advanced to him [by the insurance
company] . ..on the date prescribed in paragraph (1) for
the satisfaction of such levy." Going back to paragraph (1),
it clearly prescribes the date for satisfaction as "90 days after
service of notice of levy."' 2
This conclusion was necessary because
the defendant is entitled to have the statute applied as it was
written, not as it could have been written, nor even as Con-
gress might have intended to write it. 3
Resort to legislative history was not compelled because the words
and meaning of the statute were clear and unambiguous. 4 Never-
to litigation. For example, United States v. Dreier, 307 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
involved an action by the United States against trustees of a Vacation Fund to enforce
income tax liens against employees who had a vested monetary interest in the Fund. The
court held that where, under collective bargaining contracts, employers had agreed to pay
a certain percentage of the gross weekly pay of their employees into the Vacation Fund,
the money in the Fund was subject to income tax liens of the United States. The govern-
ment was entitled to the amount subject to the liens, interest pursuant to section 6332(c)
of 6% from the dates of the levies, and costs. In addition, the court noted that the trustees,
after honoring the levies, were protected from double liability to taxpayers or their estates
pursuant to section 6332(d). In United States v. Barker, 309 F. Supp. 1369 (W.D. Va.
1970), the lessee of a coal mine had a contractual right to receive from the lessor a certain
sum for all coal delivered by the sublessee for the preceding half month. After delivery,
the lessee was contractually bound to pay a certain amount over to the sublessee. Assess-
ment was made against the sublessee for unpaid withholding taxes, penalty and interest.
The court, in an action filed by the government seeking judgment pursuant to section
6332(c) against the lessee for failure to surrender the amount owned to the sublessee, held
that the "lessee's contractual right to receive payment was a right to property" of the
sublessee within the meaning of section 6332(a) of the Code governing levy and distraint,
even though payment had not been received by the lessee from the lessor until after the
levy. In All-Temp. Inc. v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Mo. 1972), the court held that
where a judgment was entered on May 9, 1969, a general execution was issued on Novem-
ber 5, 1969, and the Internal Revenue Service filed notices of lien under section 6332(a)
on December 11, 1969 and February 21, 1970 and served notice on the garnishee who owed
the judgment debtor a certain amount on a contract on March 20, 1970, the judgment
creditor's lien was superior to that of the Internal Revenue Service.
12. 461 F.2d at 210. See also the entire text of the statute at note 4 supra.
13. Id. at 210. For this proposition the court cited Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S.
244 (1944).
14. A statute is not to be interpreted by reference to legislative history as a matter
of course. When the words of the statute are deemed to be clear and unambiguous, the
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theless, to substantiate its position, the court reviewed the legis-
lative history and concluded that
this history does not convince us that Congress intended to
alter in any way the automatic contractual provisions of the
policy.,,
The majority interpretation is further supported by other
history may not be used to support a construction which adds to or detracts from the
significance of the words employed. However,
where a statute is of doubtful meaning and susceptible upon its face of two con-
structions, the court may look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons
which induced the act in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the
extraneous circumstances, and the purpose intended to be accomplished by it to
determine its proper construction.
H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROaLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 1145 (Cambridge tentative ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HART &
SACKS]. Legislative debates and committee reports may be considered to resolve the
meaning of a statute that is unclear or ambiguous; utilization of the reports is intended
to put the court in the position of the legislators and illuminates the circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the statute. In addition, courts have widely employed the
principle, as did the majority in Prudential, that, even though the language of a statute
is clear and the construction according to its terms does not lead to impractical or absurd
results, legislative history may be utilized to. confirm the meaning conveyed by the words
used, when a different construction is offered. United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278
U.S. 269, 277-78 (1929); George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S.
245 (1929); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
The restriction of statutory construction to the "plain meaning" of the words of clear
and unambiguous statutes is based partly on the desire to avoid "judicial legislating."
Because legislative history is generally inaccessible to the Country at large, in order for
the public to be given "fair warning" of the prohibitions and sanctions of the law, con-
struction should be limited to the "plain meaning." Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distill-
ers Corp. 341 U.S. 384, 396 (Concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson and Minton). In
addition, the reluctance to go beyond the words of unambiguous statutes is based on the
weaknesses in the other sources of information that are often utilized, such as congres-
sional debates and, to a lesser extent, committee reports. During debates legislators are
influenced by political and personal factors. The legislative record may not reflect the
unexpressed opinions of other Congressmen. Because the debates also present a variety
of opinions, it may be possible to discover support for several contradictory positions. Even
when the language of a statute is ambiguous and the use of legislative history is accept-
able, care must be exercised. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290
(1897).
For a critical discussion of the "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction
and a bibliography, see HART & SACKS, 1145, 1147. Concluding that the "plain meaning"
approach is unsupportable, Professors Hart and Sacks explain,
The meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose.
Any judicial opinion [utilizing this approach] condemns itself on its face. The
opinion is linguistically, philosophically, legally, and generally ignorant. It is de-
serving of nothing but contempt.
Id. at 1157 (emphasis by the authors).
15. 461 F.2d at 211. See notes 17, 18 and 19 and accompanying text infra for a
discussion of why measurement on the ninetieth day is necessary in order to preserve the
automatic contractual provisions of the policy.
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language in section 6332(b)(2). The relevant part of the statute
provides that the Government is entitled to the amount which the
taxpayer could have had advanced to him
on the date prescribed in paragraph (1) . . .increased by the
amount of any advance . . . made to such person on or after
the date such organization had actual notice or knowledge
. . .of the existence of the lien... , other than an advance
• . .made automatically to maintain such contract in force
under an agreement entered into before such organization
had such notice or knowledge."
The meaning of the emphasized clause, noted the majority, is
that while the insurance companies are required to pay to the
Government amounts that have been advanced from the cash
loan value to the insured after notice of levy, the companies do
not have to pay to the Government amounts, taken from the cash
loan fund, which were automatically applied to the contract pur-
suant to a pre-existing contractual provision to keep the policy in
force. 7 By preserving these automatic contractual provisions and
by using the emphasized words in 6332(b)(2), Congress indirectly
specified that the proper time to ascertain the amount due the
Government is the ninetieth day after service of notice of levy.
Only on the ninetieth day after service will the amount used to
effectuate the preserved automatic provisions have been sub-
tracted from the cash loan value. The automatic provisions would
not be preserved if the date of service was the date of ascertain-
ment since the amount on the date of the service would not reflect
any automatic advances made thereafter. In addition, if the date
16. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b)(2) (emphasis added). The entire text of the
statute is cited in note 4 supra.
17. 461 F.2d at 213. Automatic provisions vary. Many insurance contracts provide
that where the policy owner fails to make a premium payment, the premium will be
automatically paid from the cash loan value of the policy in order to keep the contract in
force. For example, a typical automatic policy loan provision was discussed by the court
in United States v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D. N.J. 1961):
If a premium thereon becomes overdue "a quarterly installment of the annual
premium . . . shall be charged against the policy as an automatic policy loan, with
interest at the rate of five and one-half per cent per annum payable in advance, as
long as the then loan value of the policy, including the cash value of any outstand-
ing dividend additions thereto and any dividend deposit at interest arising from
(the) . ..policy is sufficient to cover (the) . premium loan and all other indebt-
edness to the Company on account of (the) . . . policy.
The court in Prudential considered the automatic conversion into term insurance pur-
suant to the automatic non-forfeiture clause as a pre-existing automatic agreement to
maintain the policy in force encompassed by section 6332(b)(2). See note 19 infra and
accompanying text.
19731
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of the service was to be determinative there would have been no
need for the language "increased by the amount of any advance"
made after the levy. To determine the cash loan value on the date
of service of notice of levy and to preserve the automatic provi-
sions, Congress would have had to use language providing that
the companies are required to advance the amount existing on the
date of service less any amount automatically used to maintain
the contract in force. Therefore, to read the language of section
6332(b)(2) with meaning and to preserve the automatic provi-
sions, the ninetieth day after service of notice of levy must be the
proper time for the court to measure the cash loan value.
The majority further noted that the language in section
6332(b)(2) regarding the preservation of automatic provisions is
not specifically limited to amounts paid to maintain the contract
in force.'" Within the scope of this statutory language are any
"automatic provisions [that] take effect without action on the
part of either party to the insurance agreement." The majority
concluded that one such provision was the automatic non-
forfeiture clause in the Prudential insurance contract; therefore,
the majority preserved the provision by requiring that the cash
value be ascertained on the ninetieth day after service of notice
of levy.9
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Brown urged that service of
notice of levy should freeze the cash loan value of the policy as of
the date of service, with satisfaction to be accomplished ninety
days thereafter. This interpretation, the dissent contended,
would prevent the absurd result of allowing the tax collecting
power of the Federal Government to be effectively thwarted by
the unilateral actions of delinquent taxpayers. The majority's
reading would defeat the tax collecting power in the event of
conversion of the policy into term insurance, death of the insured,
and assignment of the policy, within the ninety day period after
service of notice of levy. While normally the clear language of a
statute is persuasive,2" the dissent continued:
18. In other words, section 6332(b)(2) is not limited to automatic provisions stipulat-
ing that the cash loan value will be used to pay overdue premiums. See note 4 supra.
19. 461 F.2d at 213. Note that the court also found in the legislative history a
determination on the part of Congress to preserve automatic provisions. See notes 14 and
15 supra and accompanying text.
20. [Tlhere is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a
statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the
purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. . ..
Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results
[VOL. XXXIII
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What might otherwise be a perfectly reasonable, common-
sense interpretation of superficially plain language must be
rejected when adopting it would frustrate or defeat the ob-
vious Congressional purpose which the statute was designed
to effectuate . . . .Here the consequence of a literal reading
is to nullify the law.2
Furthermore, to emphasize that Congress did not intend the
"ridiculous" result produced by the majority reading of the stat-
ute, Judge Brown cited from the legislative history the statement
that
"[w]here the Government levies on the cash loan values of
the contract, the insurance company generally must pay this
cash loan value over to the Government 90 days after the
levy."22
He urged that reference to legislative history was justified be-
cause of the ambiguity in the language of the statute, notwith-
standing the majority's assertion that the language is clear. While
admitting that the majority's reading of the statute, i.e., that the
cash loan value is "the amount which . . . could have [been]
advanced. . . on the date prescribed in paragraph (1)," is lingu-
istically reasonable,23 the dissent continued that the words also
bear a different meaning. The statute could be read to say that
the "levy shall be deemed to be satisfied if such organization, on
the date prescribed in paragraph (1) . . . , pays over . . .the
amount which the person. . . could have had advanced to him" 4
but merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legisla-
tion as a whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.
Id. at 213 n,1, citing United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940).
21. 461 F.2d at 213-14 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 215 n.2, citing S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1966). H.R. REP,
No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966) (emphasis apparently added by Judge Brown),
Had Judge Brown emphasized the word "generally" instead of "this," a meaning more
favorable to the majority would have resulted, for "this" implies an absolute rule while
"generally" connotes that there are exceptions to the rule.
23. This reading of section 6332(b)(2) is grammatically correct since the word
"amount" is closer to the phrase "on the date prescribed in paragraph (1)" than the word
"pays." See J. WARRINER, M. WHITTEN, F. GRIFFITH, ENGLISH GRAMMAR AND COMPOSITION
§ 8f, at 169 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1958) ("Modifying phrases and clauses should
be placed as near as possible to the words they modify."); E. WOOLLEY, NEW HANDBOOK
OF COMPOSITION 77, at 71 (rev. ed. F. Scott 1926) ("Every modifier should be so placed
that the reader connects it immediately with the member it modifies, and not with some
other member."); See also W. RAVENEL, ENGLISH REFERENCE BOOK 21a-21g, at 153-54
(4th ed. 1959).
24. 461 F.2d at 214. This reading is grammatically inappropriate. See note 23 supra.
Note that Judge Brown altered the order of the words. In addition, when the language in
a statute is grammatically "flawless" and unambiguous, common sense and faith in the
197:31
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on the date of service of notice of levy.
Judge Brown further contended that the correctness of this
version, i.e., that the cash loan value is measured on the date of
service of notice of levy, becomes apparent when sections 6331(b)
and 6332(b) are read together. The dissent noted that paragraph
(1) of section 6332(b) provides that a levy constitutes "the exer-
cise of the right of the person against whom the tax is assessed to
the advance of such amount.""5 Section 6331(b) states, "[A] levy
shall extend . ..to property possessed and obligations existing
at the time thereof."2 The majority position makes it necessary
to construe the language of section 6331(b) to mean that the levy
extends "to property possessed and obligations existing 90 days
after service of notice of levy." 7 It is unlikely, according to Judge
Brown, that Congress created two "fundamentally different kinds
of levies, those immediately operative [i.e., levies under section
6331(b)] and those having only prospective effect [i.e. levies
under 6332(b)] . 28
PRIOR CASE LAW
Because the majority, minority, and by implication the In-
ternal Revenue Service claim to have read section 6332(b) cor-
rectly; because courts may conceivably ignore the literal language
of a statute when it produces absurd results; and because the
statutory language may be ambiguous-a review of the case law
ability of congressional authors to use the English language requires that the statute be
interpreted as it appears on its face.
25. Id. at 214. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b)(1). The entire text of the section
is cited in note 4 supra.
26. 461 F.2d at 214. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331. Paragraph (b) in its entirety
provides:
(b) Seizure and sale of property.-The term "levy" as used in this title includes
the power of distraint and seizure by any means. A levy shall extend only to
property possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof. In any case in which
the Secretary or his delegate may levy upon property or rights to property, he may
seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible
or intangible).
27. 461 F.2d at 214.
28. Judge Brown also supported his position by noting Temporary Treasury Regula-
tion 400.3-1(b), which provided:
Other than satisfaction or release of the levy, no event during the 90 day period
subsequent to the date of service of notice of levy shall release the cash loan value
from the effect of the levy. For example, the termination of the policy by the
taxpayer or by death of the insured during said 90 day period shall not release the
levy.
Id. at 215 n.2 citing Temp. Treas. Reg. § 400.3-1(b) (1968). This regulation was su-
perseded by Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(b)(1) (1972). The language remained essentially the
same.
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prior to the enactment of this section and the legislative history
of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 is necessary to ascertain
which position is most valid. Prior to 1966, the Internal Revenue
Code had no provisions expressly dealing with the effect of liens
and levies on life insurance policies, but it was generally acknowl-
edged that policies owned by delinquent taxpayers were subject
to Federal tax liens under several provisions of the Code.29 One
such authority, section 6321, provided that liens could attach to
"all property or rights to property" of taxpayers."0
In the early 1940's, there was considerable litigation to deter-
mine whether the Internal Revenue Service could, by summary
procedure of service of notice of levy upon the insurance compa-
nies, exercise the rights of delinquent taxpayers to receive the
cash loan or surrender value of policies.3' The courts held that a
levy could attach to all of the taxpayer's property, including his
total rights in an unmatured insurance contract, but only after
the insured made demand for the cash surrender or loan value. 2
Only when the insured made demand did the value become
ascertainable and, therefore, capable of satisfaction. 3 In addi-
tion, the Government could only enforce the lien by judicial fore-
closure; summary procedure could not be utilized.3 4 Furthermore,
the Government in a revenue ruling agreed that the insurance
companies had priority over payments or loans made after the tax
liens arose but before actual notice to the insurance companies.
The revenue ruling36 cited the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes
in Board of Assessors of the Parish of Orleans v. New York Life
Insurance Co. 31 that a policy loan is an advance against the
amount the insurance company must eventually pay under the
policy and is not a true debt.38 "[Tihe Service seemingly con-
29. Talbot, supra note 4, at 42.
30. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321. See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6331
(a)-(b); Talbot, supra note 4, at 42.
31. Talbot, supra note 4, at 42.
32. 461 F.2d at 211. United States v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495
(3d Cir. 1942); United States v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1942); United
States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1942).
33. The Internal Revenue Service was not satisfied by these rulings, because it could
not compel the insured to make demand for the cash surrender or loan value.
34. 112 CONG. REc. 2222 (1966) (remarks of Representative Mills). See also cases
cited at note 32 supra. Talbot, supra note 4, at 42. United States v. Pennsylvania Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Home Life Ins. Co.,
355 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1966).
35. Rev. Rul. 56-48, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 561; Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
36. Rev. Rul. 56-48, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 561.
37. 216 U.S. 517 (1910).
38. Id. at 522. Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
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ceded that a life insurance company making a loan was not in the
same position as a creditor with respect to the federal tax lien."39
In 1958, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bess' "
in which the United States instituted an action in equity" to
recover from the beneficiary of several life insurance policies the
amount of delinquent federal income taxes owed by the insured
at the time of his death. Prior to the policy owner's demise, fed-
eral tax liens pursuant to section 3670 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 had attached to all of the insured's "property."4
Because the insured could not enjoy the possession of the
proceeds during his lifetime, the Court determined that the pro-
ceeds were not to be considered "property" subject to a lien
within the meaning of section 3670. However, the cash surrender
value of the policy was treated differently. Under the contract the
policyholder could have compelled the insurer to relinquish the
cash surrender value upon the surrender of the policy. The in-
sured could borrow against, assign, or pledge this right. Thus,
"Mr. Bess 'possessed just prior to his death, a chose in action in
the amount stated [i.e., the cash surrender value] which he
could have collected from the insurance companies in accordance
with the terms of the policies.' -43 The cash surrender value was,
therefore, considered to be "property" within the meaning of the
statute. Because, said the Court, the tax lien had attached to the
policy during the life of the insured, the cash surrender value was
"for some purposes" to be treated as a fund, for the benefit of the
insured, held by the insurance company and subject to the federal
tax lien.44
Although the insurance policy had matured in Bess, the In-
ternal Revenue Service, encouraged by the language of the case,45
39. Talbot supra note 4, at 43. See note 5 supra.
40. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
41. Bess involved a civil action in equity and not the summary procedure of section
311 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Court noted that section 311 is a "purely
procedural statute and has no bearing upon the liability of Mrs. Bess." 357 U.S. at 53 n.1.
42. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 3670 provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand,
the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to such
tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or
personal, belonging to such person.
43. 357 U.S. at 56, citing the court of appeals, 243 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1957).
44. Id. at 59.
45. It did not matter, in Bess, whether the lien was viewed as attaching to the
identifiable cash surrender value or to the policyholder's right to demand such amount.
Because of the death of the insured, the Supreme Court did not have to face the question
of what was attached in the situation where the policyholder was alive. Nevertheless, in
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decided to contest the earlier court holdings that the cash surren-
der value of unmatured life insurance policies could not be ob-
tained by summary procedure of service of notice of levy prior to
demand by the insured." In addition, the Government reversed
its prior acquiescence to the position that insurance companies
making loans had priority over other creditors with respect to
federal tax liens and urged the general principle of "first in time,
first in right."47 In the early 1960's, the Government often pre-
vailed at the district court level."' One result was that
the federal tax lien, once filed of record. . . had priority over
any policy loans made by the insurer, even though the in-
surer had no actual knowledge of the tax lien or had actual
notice but was required under the terms of the policy to grant
the loan automatically.49
In a series of cases in the mid 1960's,5" however, federal courts
of appeal rejected both of the Service's contentions. These courts
subsequent cases the Government and some district courts viewed the holding in Bess very
generally and ignored this possible distinction on the facts therein. See, e.g., United States
v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D. Nev. 1963); United States v. Sullivan, 203 F. Supp.
1, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1962); United States v. Wilson, 195 F. Supp. 332, 335 (D. N.J. 1961). These
cases were reversed on appeal. See note 50 infra.
46. See the cases cited in note 32 supra and note 48 infra. Talbot, supra note 4, at
43.
47. Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
48. United States v. Salerno, 222 F. Supp. 664 (D. Nev. 1963); United States v.
Bankers Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 198 F. Supp. 727 (D. N.J. 1961); United States v. Wilson,
195 F. Supp. 332 (D. N.J. 1961); United States v. Bosk, 180 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Fla. 1960).
Contra, United States v. Birrell, 233 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v.
Mitchell, 210 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Ala. 1962). See Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
49. Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
50. United States v. Home Life Ins., 355 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v.
Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1965); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 71
(9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Wilson, 333 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964); Equitable Life Ins. Soc'y v. United States, 331 F.2d
29 (1st Cir. 1964). Talbot, supra note 4, at 43. The circuit courts of appeal in reversing
the district court cases expressly distinguished Bess. See note 45 supra. See, e.g., United
States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1964) wherein the court explained:
But the Bess case involved a clearly distinguishable situation, one in which a
delinquent taxpayer who was the insured in various life insurance policies, died and
the Government on the basis of a pre-existing tax lien on the taxpayer's interest in
the policies, sought to impose liability on the beneficiary in the policies' proceeds.
Since the policies concerned had matured, no specific question was presented in
that case as to the effective relationship between the contracting parties during the
executory phase of the policies' existence . . ..
The instant question certainly was not directly before the Supreme Court in Bess
since, as previously mentioned, the insurance policies in question in that case had
matured . . . .The Court did not even imply in Bess that the tax lien attached to
any specific property held by the insurers . . . .We therefore fail to see any merit
in the Government's position.
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held that a mere tax levy could not reach the cash loan or surren-
der value of unmatured insurance policies and that, before actual
notice of the tax lien by the Government, insurance companies
were free to grant loans to policy owners." Such loans could also
be granted after actual notice if the insurance contract contained
an automatic premium loan provision predating actual notice to
the company.5" The courts so held partly to prevent the Internal
Revenue Service from interfering in pre-existing contractual ar-
rangements between the taxpayer and the insurance company. 3
The holdings were also based on an interpretation of sections
6331(a) and (b) that the right of an insured to demand these
values was not included in "the definition of property possessed
and obligations existing at the time" of the levy.54
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The Internal Revenue Service and the insurance industry,
inspired by work of the American Bar Association,55 took a bold
step to work together, rather than to continue the court battles
over federal tax liens in general. The Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966, the first substantial revision in tax lien laws since 1913, is
the result of their efforts. The Act is an attempt to delineate and
to accommodate, in the modern commercial setting, the respec-
tive rights of the Internal Revenue Service, creditors and other
parties to property in which delinquent taxpayers have an inter-
est. 56 Included in the Act are sections 6323 and 6332, which specif-
51. See the cases cited in note 50 supra. Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
52. Talbot, supra note 4, at 43.
53. United States v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1965).
54. 461 F.2d at 211; United States v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1965); United
States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964).
55. See ABA Final Report of the Committee on Federal Liens (1959), reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 before the Comm. on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 75-213 (1966). The Committee was appointed on
March 31, 1958 and thereafter received contributions from the Staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Internal Revenue Taxation, from the Legal Advisory Staff of the Treasury Depart-
ment, from the Office of Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, from the Collec-
tion Division of the National Office, Internal Revenue Service, from lawyers, and from
business groups. This Report contained a proposed draft of new legislation.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1966). This purpose is explained
by the reports.
This bill is in part an attempt to conform the lien provisions of the internal revenue
laws to the concepts developed in the Uniform Commercial Code. It represents an
effort to adjust the provisions in the internal revenue laws relating to the collection
of taxes of delinquent persons to the more recent developments in commercial
practice . ..
S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966).
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ically involve life insurance policies. 7
The Government, the insurance industry, and other private
creditors made the demands and concessions inherent in all com-
promise legislation. For example, demands by the private sector
resulted in expansion of the "super priorities," the exceptions to
the rule that the Government lien, once attached, takes priority
over other interests.58 Section 6323(b) lists ten types of interest
having priority over tax liens previously filed. The insurance rep-
resentatives insisted on sections 6323(b)(9)(A) and (B), which
codified the circuit court cases decided in the mid-1960's. 9 These
sections provide:
Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has
been filed, such lien shall not be valid-
57. The Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, P.L. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 addresses a large
array of commercial problems. Many of the sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
were amended by the Act. Title I of the Act involves the priority and effect of tax liens
and levies. Section 101 of the Act amends section 6323 of the Code regarding the validity
and priority of tax liens against holders of security interests and provides protection for
certain interests, even though notice has been filed, such as securities, motor vehicles,
personal property purchased at retail, personal property purchases in a casual sale, per-
sonal property subject to possessory liens, real property subject to taxes and assessments,
residential property subject to mechanics' liens for repairs and improvements, attorneys'
liens, insurance contracts, passbook loans, and commercial transaction's financing agree-
ments.
Further, the following sections of the Act amend the respective sections of the Code:
Section 102-section 6324 of the Code (concerning special liens for estate and gift taxes);
section 103-section 6325 (regarding release of liens or discharges of property); section
104-sections 6331(b), 6332, 6334(a), 6335(b), 6337(b), 6338(c), 6339, 6342, and 6343 (with
regard to seizure of property for collection of taxes); section 105-section 3505 (regarding
the liability of third parties paying or providing for wages); section 106-section 6503(b)
and 6503(c) (concerning suspension of the running of the period of limitations); section
107-sections 7402 and 7403(c) (concerning proceedings where the United States has title
to property); section 108-section 7424 (regarding intervention by the United States);
section 109-subchapter B of chapter 76 of the Code (redesignating section 7425 as 7427
and adding 7425 as a new section regarding discharge of liens); section 110-subchapter
B of chapter 76 of the Code (adding after section 7425, new sections 7426, 6532 and 7421,
concerning civil actions by persons other than taxpayers); section 111-sections 7505 and
7506(a) (regarding the sale of property acquired by United States); section
112-subchapter A of chapter 80 (adding section 7810 as a new section; section 7810
concerns revolving funds for redemption of real property by the United States); section
113-sections 6322 and 6502(a) (with regard to the effect of judgment on tax liens and
levies).
Title II of the Act is denoted "Consent of United States to be Sued In Actions
Affecting Property In Which It Has A Lien Or Interest." Section 201 of the Act amends
section 2410 of the Code regarding joinder of the United States in certain proceedings.
Section 202 of the Act amends section 1346 of the Code concerning jurisdiction and venue
in certain actions against the United States.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b).
59. See cases cited in note 50 supra.
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With respect to a life insurance, endowment, or annuity con-
tract, as against the organization which is the insurer under
such contract, at any time-
before such organization had actual notice or knowledge of
the existence of such lien; [or]
after such organization had such notice or knowledge, with
respect to advances required to be made automatically to
maintain such contract in force under an agreement entered
into before such organization had such notice or knowledge
60
The insurance industry could consider this to be a large conces-
sion by the Government in light of the unsettled nature of the
problem."
The Government concessions, however, were balanced by
demands. Section 6332(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
which provides the Government the right to levy by summary
procedure on the cash loan value of unmatured life insurance
policies of delinquent taxpayers, illustrates one such successful
demand.62 Prior to promulgation of this section, the Government
had to utilize the expensive and time consuming judicial foreclo-
sure procedure in order to recover the cash surrender value of the
insurance policy.63 The Government also could not receive the
cash surrender value until the date of judgment, because the
contractual relations between the insured and the insurance com-
pany were unaffected pending final judgment. 4 However, by the
summary procedure of section 6332(b), "the Government would,
in effect, be exercis[ing] . . . the right of the person against
whom the tax is assessed to the advance of such [cash loan
value] .65
Even though the Internal Revenue Service had been unable
to obtain the right to levy by summary procedure in previous
court litigation, the insurance industry yielded to this demand.
One probable reason for the concession was that the summary
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(b)(9)(A) and (B).
61. While the insurance industry was successful in litigation, there was no certainty
that the industry would continue its victories. In addition, defending government suits
was expensive and time consuming.
62. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6332. The entire text of this section is cited at note 4
supra.
63. 112 CONG. REC. 22225 (1966) (remarks of Representative Mills, Chairman, House
Commiteee on Ways and Means).
64. 461 F.2d at 211. United States v. Home Life Ins. Co., 355 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1966);
United States v. Sullivan, 333 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1964).
65. 461 F.2d at 211.
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levy procedure aids the insured. Previously, foreclosure had ter-
minated the insurance contract and all of the rights of the policy
owner. The insured often had difficulty procuring new life insur-
ance protection because of uninsurability or high premiums occa-
sioned by age or ill health. In addition, foreclosure deprived inno-
cent beneficiaries of their benefits under the policy. As noted in
Prudential the foreclosure procedure imposed penalties "beyond
those necessary to meet the needs of Government." 6 On the other
hand, the exercise of the summary levy procedure of section
6332(b) does not terminate the insurance contract. Furthermore,
the ninety day provision gives the policy owner the opportunity
to satisfy the tax claim from other sources and thus enables him
to preserve the insurance coverage. 7
The insurance industry also received direct benefits from the
summary tax levy procedure. The burden of litigating foreclosure
suits is reduced. Moreover, the resulting continuation of insur-
ance contracts benefits the industry financially. Because the
ninety day provision encourages taxpayers to satisfy the lien from
resources other than the cash loan value, the likelihood that the
contract will be adversely affected has been lessened. In any
event, since the summary procedure does not require immediate
payment, the insurance company retains rights in the taxpayer's
money for an additional quarter year. Also, the Government
agreed to allow companies to ignore the tax lien after the ninety
day levy has been honored unless the Government files a new
notice of a tax lien." Previously, the companies had to carry the
tax lien restraints on their records until they received a release
of the lien. Often, the restraints remained on the books for years
and required costly and time consuming bookkeeping. 9 Section
6332 thus helps the insurance industry to remain as unencum-
bered in its contractual dealings as possible.
66. Id.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966); S.R. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1966); Talbot, supra note 4, at 45.
68. INT. REV. CooE OF 1954, § 6323(b)(9)(C) provides:
Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed, such lien shall
not be valid-
[wlith respect to a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract, as against the
organization which is the insurer under such contract, at any time-
after satisfaction of a levy pursuant to section 6332(b), unless and until the
Secretary or his delegate delivers to such organization a notice, executed after the
date of such satisfaction, of the existence of such lien.
See also Talbot, supra note 4, at 45.
69. Talbot, supra note 4, at 45.
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Not only was the insurance industry interested in reducing
restrictions upon its contractual dealings; the House Committee
on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance dis-
closed an interest in the preservation of the pre-existing contrac-
tual rights between taxpayers and other interested parties. ° Sec-
tion 6332(b)(2) specifically manifests this intent. Although the
statute generally does not allow the cash loan value to be reduced
by advances made after service of notice of levy, it does by the
express language at least allow automatic advances to be made
by the insurance company pursuant to a pre-existing contractual
obligation "to maintain such contract in force." 7'
The statute, therefore, in view of prior law, discloses an at-
tempt to accommodate the interests of the Federal Government
in collecting delinquent taxes with the varied interests of taxpay-
ers, insurers and other parties.72 While the history previously dis-
cussed may lead to either of the conclusions drawn in Prudential
regarding the date on which the cash loan value is to be mea-
sured, there is significant legislative history, which both the ma-
jority and the dissent failed to cite, specifically addressing this
issue.
The Committee on Ways and Means reported to the House:
"Usually, the amount to be paid in satisfaction of the levy is the
cash loan value of the delinquent taxpayer's contract 90 days
after the date on which the notice of levy is served on the insur-
er. '7:' The report continues that the new levy procedure is an
alternative "collection tool" available to the Government, rather
than an exclusive means for collecting delinquent taxes from the
taxpayer's policy.74 Civil actions and foreclosure suits are also
appropriate procedures to reach the cash surrender value of in-
surance contracts. "A tax lien foreclosure action is necessary, for
instance, to reach any equity the delinquent taxpayer may have
in term and extended term insurance. ' 75
Furthermore, a "Statement for the Record by Government
Official" submitted to the House Committee on Ways and Means
by the Honorable Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the
70. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1966); S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 17-18 (1966). See also 112 CONG. RPc. 22210 (1966) (remarks of Representative
Martin).
71. 461 F.2d at 213. See notes 16-19 supra and the accompanying text. Section
6323(b)(9)(B) similarly demonstrates Congress' intent in this regard. See note 62 supra
and accompanying text.
72. 112 CONG. REc. 22224-25 (1966) (remarks of Representative Mills).
73. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1966).
74. Id. at 59.
75. Id.
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Treasury and prepared by Sheldon S. Cohen, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, was made part of the Record without objection
by the Committee. The Statement explicates by section the
Treasury Department's understanding of the proposed changes to
the Internal Revenue Code. With regard to section 6332(b) the
Assistant Secretary stated:
The new procedure authorizes the Secretary or his delegate
to levy on an insurance company to secure the cash loan
value of the taxpayer's insurance policy, as of the 90th day
after the levy is made . . . . In some circumstances it may
still be necessary for the United States to bring an action to
foreclose its tax lien on an insurance policy or to enforce the
lien in some other civil action. The new subsection specifi-
cally provides that the satisfaction of a levy by an insurance
company will be without prejudice to any such proceeding."
Therefore, the House Committee on Ways and Means, which is
primarily responsible for drafting the Act, and the Internal Reve-
nue Service, which is responsible for implementing the Act, at the
time of consideration of the Bill, presaged the majority's reading
of section 6332(b).
Actions of the Internal Revenue Service, immediately
following passage of the Federal Tax Lien Act further reveal that
the Treasury Department understood Congress' intent to provide
for receipt of the cash loan value as determined on the ninetieth
day after service of notice of levy. At that time, representatives
of the Internal Revenue Service indicated to the insurance indus-
try that the companies would have a "reasonable time," after the
expiration of the ninety days, in which to process loan payments
for the satisfaction of the section 6332(b) levy." The "grace" pe-
riod was permitted, because insurers are unable to determine
with certainty the amount of cash loan value existing on the
ninetieth day after service until the arrival of that day. This
uncertainty is present because the Government is entitled to the
increased cash loan value resulting from additional permanent
insurance purchased with dividends declared after the date of
service but before the ninetieth day after service. 8
76. Hearings on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290 before the Comm. on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1966) (emphasis added). It is
arguable that the language of the "Statement" is as ambiguous as the language in section
6332(b). The language "as of the ninetieth day" could attach either to the words "secure"
or "cash loan value." See note 23 and 24 and accompanying text supra.
77. Talbot, supra note 4, at 45.
78. Id.
19731
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
With this background of diverse interests in an atmosphere
of compromise, it is understandable how a "literal" and gram-
matical reading of section 6332(b) might not be readily accepta-
ble to everyone, especially to people who are unaware of the un-
publicized but clear expressions of congressional and governmen-
tal intent that the amount the Government may receive from the
section 6332(b) levy is the cash loan value as determined on the
ninetieth day after service of notice of levy. Many commercial
lawyers probably will not find the "plain" meaning given to the
statute by the majority to be even an arguable meaning because
generally levies are operative upon demand by the Secretary or
his delegate.79 Judge Brown in his dissent also stated that he
found it unlikely that Congress would have created both prospec-
tive and immediately operative levies. However, this section was
not enacted by "knowledgeable commercial lawyers" in a vac-
uum, but by legislators, who were in essence negotiators between
the various interest groups. In this atmosphere of compromise it
was extremely unlikely that the resulting law would be internally
consistent with other sections of the Code. Even if the drafters
could have included in the act every point desired, they may not
have considered the Prudential situation."
On the other hand, Congress and the interested groups may
have had good reasons for intending that the determination be
made on the ninetieth day after service of notice of levy. The
Government may have desired the determination of the cash loan
value on the ninetieth day because, when premium payments and
dividends are made, the cash loan value increases, and, therefore,
the Government is entitled to collect more money to satisfy the
tax claim. The insurance industry may also have requested the
ninety day deferral period in order to eliminate immediate pay-
ment and to keep funds for a longer period. In addition, measure-
ment on the ninetieth day is more consistent with the general
industry practice of including a provision in the policy reserving
to the insurer the right to defer policy loan payments to the in-
sured for a period of time, often ranging from ninety days to six
months. It is also possible that the insurance interests lobbied for
the ninety day provision in order to preserve automatic non-
79. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(a) states that levies are to be satisfied upon
demand by the Secretary except as otherwise provided. It should be noted that section
6332(b) is one of the exceptions.
80. "Had Congress squarely confronted the particular terms of the policy, it might
well have made a different provision to enable the Government to recover." United States
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 461 F.2d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 1972).
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forfeiture clauses. This possibility is impressive in light of the
extensive use of automatic non-forfeiture clauses in insurance
contracts today8 and in view of Congress' predisposition to avoid
interference in pre-existing contractual rights. In addition to
these factors the relevant congressional committees and the
Treasury Department specifically referred to the section 6332(b)
levy as "a new procedure."82
APPLICATION-THREE PROBLEM AREAS
It is true, as Judge Brown noted, and as commercial lawyers
may also argue, that this summary levy procedure may, in three
situations-i.e., death of the insured, assignment of the policy,
and conversion of the policy, within the ninety day period after
service of notice of levy-create complications. It is questionable,
however, whether these complications are of such a magnitude
that they render the results of a literal reading of the statute
"absurd." Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider Judge Brown's
specific points.
Judge Brown explained that, if the majority construction is
followed, upon death of the insured delinquent taxpayer before
the ninetieth day after service, the levy is defeated because the
insured's interest in the policy no longer exists on the date for
satisfaction. This problem, however, was foreseen by the various
interest groups in 1966 and was probably considered of minor
significance in light of other possible remedies. A similar situa-
tion had occurred in United States v. Bess,13 wherein the Supreme
Court provided that in a civil action in equity the Government
would receive enough of the cash surrender value as of the date
of the insured's death to satisfy the tax debt; the beneficiaries
would realize the remainder. In addition, congressional reports
emphasized that the summary levy procedure of section 6332(b)
is not intended to eliminate the Government's right to make
use of foreclosure suits with respect to these policies where
it still deems this appropriate or necessary.81
Section 6332(b)(3) and Treasury Regulation section 301.6332-2(d)
further provide that the levy is without prejudice to any other
81. VANCE, note 5 supra, at 607.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1966).
83. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
84. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966); S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1966). 112 CONG. Rlc. 22209 (1966) (remarks of Representative Trimble).
19731
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
civil actions for the enforcement of a lien.8 5 Therefore, while the
alternative summary levy procedure of section 6332(b) may be-
come inoperative, the tax collecting power of the Government is
not defeated.
The second situation that concerned Judge Brown is the as-
signment of the insurance policy by the insured within the ninety
day period after service of notice of the levy. In this situation, the
insured has no rights in the policy on the date for satisfaction of
the levy. Since the Government cannot exercise taxpayer's non-
existent rights to the cash loan value of the insurance policy, the
Government is defeated. The drafters, however, were aware of
this situation and provided that the lien, once attached, follows
the policy. 6 Therefore, if the delinquent taxpayer utilizes the
ninety day period after notice to transfer the policy either to the
beneficiaries or to other parties, then the transferee or third party
must discharge the tax lien on the policy pursuant to section
6325.11
Any transferee may, ordinarily, secure the discharge of the
contract by paying to the Government the amount of the
cash surrender value of the contract at the time the certifi-
cate of discharge is issued, and continue the contract in force
by paying the premiums . . .8
and interest on the policy loans resulting from the Government
85. Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(d) (1972). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6332(b)(3) pro-
vides:
(3) Enforcement proceedings. -The satisfaction of a levy under paragraph (2)
shall be without prejudice to any civil action for the enforcement of any lien im-
posed by this title with respect to such contract.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 59 (1966).
87. Id. at 14. See also S. REp. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1966) (discussing
the changes in section 6325 relating to release of the lien or to the discharge of the
property). Section 6325(a)(2) provides for the release of any federal tax lien if the Secre-
tary is furnished and accepts a "bond that is conditioned upon payment of the amount
assessed together with all interest in respect thereof, within the time prescribed by law
. . .. Section 6325(b)(3) authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to issue a certificate
of discharge when property subject to the lien is sold and when there is an agreement
between the seller and the Service to hold the proceeds from the sale as a fund subject to
the liens and claims of the United States in the same manner and with the same priority
as the liens and claims on the discharged property. Section 6325(d) further authorizes the
Internal Revenue Service to issue certificates subordinating a tax lien to another interest
where there is paid over to the Service "an amount equal to the amount with respect to
which the tax lien is subordinated." This subordination may also be exercised when the
Service believes that a larger amount will ultimately be realized by the United States from
property subject to the lien and when the subordination will aid in the collection of the
tax claim.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1966).
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levy. 9 The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Finance Committee both explained that in no event could the
Government be injured by this new, flexible procedure for collect-
ing delinquent taxes. 0
The third situation that the dissent viewed as defeating the
Government's tax collecting power is the exercise of the auto-
matic non-forfeiture clauses by the insured. However, if the Gov-
ernment's tax collecting power was defeated in the situation pre-
sented in Prudential, it was again due to the Service's failure to
exercise its options. The Government could have instituted a
foreclosure proceeding. Alternatively, the Service could have
acted to keep the summary levy procedure operative. When the
Government anticipates that the whole life insurance policy will
lapse or will be converted into term insurance with no cash loan
value because of a default in premium payments by the insured,
the Government may "permit a premium loan to keep the policy
in force or to reinstate it . . . ,,9, Most life insurance contracts
include such "a premium loan" clause which provides for the
automatic payment of overdue premiums from the cash loan
value. 2 Congress anticipated that the "premium loan" clause
would be utilized on occasion for the benefit of the Government;
Congress therefore enabled insurers in section 6332(b)(2) to make
policy loans to keep the contract in force without company liabil-
ity to the Government for the resulting reduction in the cash loan
value. Use of the "premium loans" to keep the policy in force
generally will net the Government more cash than a foreclosure
suit not only because the foreclosure procedure is costly and time
89. S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1966).
90. Id., H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1966). If such a transfer is
fraudulent, the Government is afforded additional protection not noted by the Committee.
The interest of a debtor in his life insurance policy, payable to himself or his estate, like
other choses in action, may be reached by his creditors if fraudulently assigned or other-
wise disposed of by the insured while the insured is in debt. Gould v. Fleitman, 176 N.Y.S.
631 (Sup. Ct., App. Div.), aff'd, 130 N.E. 897 (1919), aff'd, 230 N.Y. 569 (1920). In some
jurisdictions this rule has been limited to the situation in which the policy has a surrender
value at the time of transfer. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Flicker, 101 F,2d 857 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 307 U.S. 641 (1939). In the federal context, Bess explained:
The transfer of property subsequent to the attachment of the lien does not affect
the lien, for 'it is of the very nature and essence of a lien, that no matter into whose
hands the property goes, it passes cum onere. . . .' Burton v. Smith, 13 Pet. 464,
483, 10 L.Ed. 248; See Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338, 340, 63 S.Ct. 302,
87 L.Ed. 312.
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958).
91. Talbot, supra note 4, at 46. Query whether the government will have knowledge
of the exact terms of the policy.
92. See note 17 supra.
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consuming, but also because
the cash surrender value of extended term insurance con-
stantly decreases, and the courts have held that the Govern-
ment is entitled only to the cash surrender value of extended
term insurance as of the date of judgment in the foreclosure
action.93
The three specific situations in which the tax collecting
power of the Federal Government may be defeated unilaterally by
a delinquent taxpayer, which situations compelled Judge Brown
to conclude that a literal reading of the statute leads to an absurd
result, are thus illusory. Assignment of the contract during the
ninety day period cannot defeat the levy. In addition, the insured
generally will not allow his policy to be automatically converted
into a form of insurance with no cash loan value. By doing so, he
is inviting foreclosure, which would deny him and his beneficiar-
ies any benefits of the policy. The possibility of death occurring
within ninety days after service is the only realistic situation by
which the summary procedure becomes inoperative. Although
this may be unilateral action by the taxpayer, it should hardly
be characterized as "wholly within his own control," as the dis-
sent suggested. Even if death of the insured occurs, the Govern-
ment can still file a foreclosure suit or civil suit in equity. There-
fore, either the summary levy procedure remains operative or the
Government is afforded other remedies. Lastly, if Judge Brown's
reading of section 6332(b) is correct, i.e., the cash loan value is
measured on the date of service of notice of levy, then there would
be little need for the express preservation by Congress of the
alternative tax collecting procedures.94
Judge Brown was not alone in his disagreement with the
literal reading of Section 6332(b). Although the most recent
Treasury Regulation, section 301.6332-2(c) (1), which superseded
Temporary Treasury Regulation 400.3-1(b),95 provides that sec-
tion 6332(b) requires the insurance companies to pay
over to the district director the amount which the person
93. Talbot, supra note 4, at 46. See also United States v. Home Life Ins. Co., 355
F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Mitchell, 349 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1965).
94. If Judge Brown's reading were correct, the only need for the preservation of
foreclosure actions would be in the case of complex suits where, for example, there are
several complaints or disputed amounts. However, legislative history discloses different
purposes for preserving foreclosure. See note 75 supra and accompanying text. See also
note 83 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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against whom the tax is assessed could have had advanced
to him by the organization on the 90th day after service of
notice of levy on the organization"
-in agreement with the legislative history and the majority in
Prudential-the Internal Revenue Service has carved out several
exceptions. One exception is described as follows:
In the event of termination of the policy . . . by the death
of the insured on a date before the 90th day after service of
the notice of levy, the amount to be paid over to the district
director by the insuring organization in satisfaction of the
levy shall be an amount computed in accordance with the
provisions of this subparagraph substituting. . the date of
death for the 90th day.9 7
Although this section of the regulation was promulgated in April
of 1972 apparently as a result of the holding of the district court
in Prudential in 1971, it is inconsistent with the positions urged
by the majority and minority therein, with the general statement
above and with example (3) of the same Treasury Regulation. 8
This interpretation of section 6332(b) in the regulation also differs
from the congressional explanations of the section as well as the
"Statement For The Record" by the Commissioner of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. Another exception to the general statement
in Treasury Regulation 301.6332(c)(2) is observed in example (3)
therein. Where the insurance contract is automatically converted
to paid-up term insurance with no cash loan value, because of the
failure of the insured to make premium payments (the Prudential
case), the Regulation intimates that the insurance company is to
pay to the district director the cash loan value existing on the
date of service of notice of levy:
Since the service of the notice of levy constitutes the exercise
of A's right to receive the cash loan value and the amount
applied to effect the conversion is not an automatic advance
to A to maintain the policy in force, the conversion of the
policy is not an event which will release the cash loan value
from the effect of the levy. 9
It is therefore evident that the Internal Revenue Service is
interpreting the same statutory language differently under
96. Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(c)(1) (1972).
97. Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(c)(1) (1972).
98. See note 99 infra and accompanying text.
99. Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-2(c)(2) (ex. 3) (1972).
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slightly different circumstances, in order to best accommodate its
ends, irrespective of the true meaning of the statute as explained
in Prudential. Differing regulations in the case of death and con-
version is particularly confounding because the "Statement For
The Record" made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
clearly demonstrated that the Service understood the mechanics
of section 6332(b) when the Act was being drafted.
CONCLUSION
While the legislative history of the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966 clearly demonstrates that one of the purposes of the Act was
to settle the controversy existing between the Internal Revenue
Service and the insurance industry with regard to rights in poli-
cies owned by delinquent taxpayers, the conflict continues. In
relying on the clear language of the statute as grammatically
written to declare that the cash loan value should be determined
on the ninetieth day after service of notice of levy, the court
served notice that section 6332(b) will not be interpreted to reach
a result that is not apparent on the face of the law. The majority
correctly recognized that it is not the function of the court to "sit
as a committee of revision" when in disagreement with congres-
sional legislation that causes no unreasonable inequity.' In fact,
courts must avoid such modification by interpretation except in
the most compelling situations in order to protect against "con-
verting what was meant to be open and precise, into a concealed
trap for the unsuspecting . .'.1."01 Moreover had the dissent's
position been sanctioned by the court there would have been no
predictability and consistency in future litigation. Furthermore,
since the majority's position was consistent with the clear word-
ing of the statute and substantiated by legislative history, the
minority's interpretation would have engendered more litigation.
One problem remains. The most recent Internal Revenue
Regulations are inconsistent with section 6332(b). The Internal
Revenue Service is not authorized to legislate in its regulations,
for, although the Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury
to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
100. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306 (1967).
101. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253 (1929).
Furthermore, if courts are free to modify compromise legislation in order to better serve
the general purpose of the statute, when the legislation causes no unreasonable inequity,
common sense warns of the reluctance of potential parties to participate in legislative
negotiations when their bargains may be so easily avoided.
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enforcement" of the law,' 2 regulations must fall within the scope
of authority delegated by Congress to implement the Code in a
reasonable manner.' 03 The Judiciary must assure that the Com-
missioner's regulations are reasonable and consistent with the
Code;' 04 when they are defective, the federal courts must hold
them invalid. Unless the Internal Revenue Service acquiesces in
the Prudential decision and rescinds the regulation, the Service
has made further litigation necessary."'5 Although no legislation
is an absolute solution-there are always ambiguities in the lan-
guage of statutes-further litigation over the interpretation of
section 6332(b) is unwarranted.
102. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1970).
103. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (Courts "do not sit on a
committee of revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws.").
104. Davis v. United States, Civil No. 25, 736 (2d Cir. May 23, 1972).
105. Decisions of courts other than the United States Supreme Court, bind the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service only in the actual case litigated. J.
CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 5 at 14 (West ed. 1968). In an identical situation,
occurring in the same jurisdiction, the Commissioner may acquiesce in the court's holding,
or proceed independently. Id. For example, if an insurance company determines the cash
loan value on the ninetieth day after service of notice of levy pursuant to section 6332(b),
in the Fifth Circuit, (which held this to be the proper procedure in United States v.
Prudential), the Commissioner may, notwithstanding the Prudential case, insist on the
determination on the date of service. For an in-depth historical examination of the prac-
tice of the Internal Revenue Service to follow or to disregard the "common law" of the
courts, see Dwan, The Administrative Review of Judicial Decisions: Treasury Practice,
46 COLUM. L. REv. 581 (1946).

